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The United States has often celebrated its heritage as "a nation of
immigrants," most recently during the festivities surrounding the renova-
tion of the Statue of Liberty and Ellis Island.1 The centennial paid hom-
age to romantic themes originally captured by the poet Emma Lazarus in
the inscription on the Statue of Liberty:
Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore,
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed, to me:
I lift my lamp beside the golden door.'
Yet a fundamental ambivalence has always marred this vision of the
United States as a haven for the distressed. During the last century, this
ambivalence has produced a series of laws restricting immigration.3
Recently, an influx of illegal aliens has generated renewed interest in
immigration as a public policy issue. The debate over illegal immigration
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1. The July, 1986 extravaganza lasted four days and climaxed in the largest fireworks display in
history. It is estimated that six million people participated in the celebrations including a fleet of
20,000 boats in New York Harbor. On Ellis Island, in a naturalization ceremony linked to five
different cities via satellite, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger led an estimated 16,000 immigrants in
reciting the Oath of Allegiance. Stengel, The Lady's Party, TIME, July 14, 1986, at 10; The Spirit of
'86, NEWSWEI.K, July 14, 1986, at 21. It would be difficult to overstate the importance of the Statue
of Liberty and Ellis Island as symbols of the immigration experience. During the last 100 years, some
17 million people sailed past the Statue of Liberty before arriving at Ellis Island. Iacocca, What
Liberty Means To Me, NEWSWEEK, July 7, 1986, at 18.
2. E. LAZARUS, THE, Nr:w Coi.osus (1883), reprinted in J. KENNErDY, A NATION OF IMMI-
GRANT 31 (1964).
3. See, e.g. J. KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 17-68 and 72-76. The cynical view of the American
stance on immigration was aptly captured by an anonymous poem printed in 1952 in response to the
passage of legislation which restricted immigration:
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culminated, on November 6, 1986, in the passage of the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986.' The new law, originally introduced in
1983 as the Simpson-Mazzoli Bill,5 prohibits employers from hiring ille-
gal aliens and offers legal status to millions of illegal aliens who already
reside in the United States. The debate over passage of the bill predictably
revolved around the opposing goals of maintaining America's traditional
open-door policy' and protecting American society from an onslaught of
foreigners. 7
This Article attempts to pierce the traditional rhetoric by offering an
alternative model that explains immigration policy enforcement. To do so,
the Article uses the interest group theory of government to identify groups
with a direct interest in immigration, and posits that the level of immigra-
tion policy enforcement will be determined by a balancing of their de-
mands. Part I provides a brief historical overview of U.S. immigration
policy. Part II sets forth a general outline of the interest group theory of
government, and suggests specific hypotheses regarding the enforcement of
immigration policy over the course of the business cycle. Specifically, the
Article contends that the level of U.S. immigration policy enforcement is
explained in part by the desire of organized interest groups to influence
domestic wages. In times of economic contraction, groups interested in
preventing wage reductions-labor unions, for example-have an incen-
tive to lobby for enforcement of restrictive immigration laws in order to
prevent unfavorable expansion in the work force. Similarly, when
The blood that made this nation great
Will now be tested at the gate
To see if it deserves to be
Admitted to democracy,
Or rather to that small elite
Whose hemoglobin counts can meet
Requirements of purity
Consistent with security
And with that small and rabid mind
That thinks itself above mankind.
IMMIGRATION: AN AMERICAN DILEMMA ix (B. Ziegler ed. 1953). For an interesting discussion of
America's changing attitudes toward immigration from the colonial period to the present, see Adams,
A Dubious Host, 7 WItSON Q., 108 (1983).
4. N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1986, at A12, col. 1.
5. S. 529, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983); H.R. 1510, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). For a brief
account of the bill's legislative history, see V. BRIGGS, IMMIGRATION AND THE AMERICAN LABOR
FORCE 89-92 (1984).
6. For example, Senator Phil Gramm (R-Texas), who led the opposition to the 1986 Act, felt it
necessary to state, "This immigration bill is not a response to a fear of foreigners. We are not symbol-
ically tearing down the Statue of Liberty. It is not my intention ever to slam the door to America."
N.Y. Times, October 18, 1986, at A8, col. 5.
7. Upon signing the Act, President Reagan stated, "Future generations of Americans will be
thankful for our efforts to humanely regain control of our borders and thereby preserve the value of
one of the most sacred possessions of our people, American citizenship." N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1986, at
A12, col. 1.
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domestic labor markets are "tight," groups such as employers have an
incentive to lobby for reduced enforcement of these laws in order to relieve
upward pressure on wages. Part III describes the model and reports the
results of its application. Based on data covering the years 1900 through
1982, immigration policy enforcement was indeed found to be
countercyclical, becoming more restrictive during economic downturns and
easing during economic expansions. The Article concludes with a brief
discussion of the policy implications of this analysis.
I. An Overview of U.S. Immigration Policy
Since 1875, when Congress passed the first restrictive legislation gov-
erning the admission of aliens,' at least seventy laws and Supreme Court
decisions affecting immigration have been issued.' Lawmakers have
treated immigration from a variety of perspectives; restrictions have been
based on narrowly defined characteristics, on broad qualitative criteria,
such as national origin, and on precise numerical formulae.'0 Most of
these policy changes came in response to the arrival of waves of immi-
grants from a range of different countries." Although these influxes were
fueled by a variety of causes, including religious and political persecution,
the main factors driving immigration have generally been economic, as
migrants have tended to move to countries where real wages are higher.'2
The first legal restrictions on immigration to the United States barred
such "undesirables" as convicts, prostitutes, idiots, lunatics, and paupers.'
This type of qualitative restriction was later extended to exclude those
believing in anarchy or the assassination of public officials.' 4 As of 1984,
8. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (1875). The law provided for inquiry by consular
officers as to contracts of immigrants coming from the Orient for "service" or for "lewd or immoral
purposes," and barred convicts.
9. These laws and decisions are canvassed in Kellogg, Two Centuries of Immigration Laws, I &
N REP., Winter 1975-76, at 29-42.
10. For a summary of the historical restrictions on immigration, see C. GORDON & E. GORDON,
IMMIGRATION AND NATIONAI.ITY LAW §§ 1.Ic-1.3 (1984).
11. See J. KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 92-94.
12. See id. at 6-9 for a general discussion of forces motivating immigration. An extensive litera-
ture supports the view that immigration is largely driven by differences in real wages between coun-
tries. See, e.g., W. ADAMS, THE BRAIN DRAIN (1968); Scott, Transatlantic and North American
International Migration, in NORrH AMERICAN AND WESTERN EUROPEAN ECONOMIC POLICIES
436-38 (C. Kindleberger & A. Shonfield eds. 1971). Wage differentials are also important in explain-
ing both external and internal migration patterns. See Dunlevy & Bellante, Net Migration, Endoge-
nous Incomes and the Speed of Adjustment to the North-South Differential, 65 REv. ECON. & STA-
TIS'I(S 66 (1983). None of this earlier work focuses on enforcement as an important influence on
immigration.
13. See V. BRIG;S, supra note 5, at 27.
14. See J. KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 92.
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there remained no fewer than thirty-three categories of qualitative
exclusion. 5
Congress later supplemented these barriers with more stringent restric-
tions based on nationality. In 1882, Congress barred Chinese laborers
from entering the United States; 6 in 1917, Congress expanded on this
theme by limiting entry into the United States based on an immigrant's
origin. 17
Congress placed the first quantitative limits on total immigration in
1921.1 In 1924, Congress combined national and quantitative restrictions
by introducing the principle of "national origin" and putting in place the
first immigration quota system. 9 Under the national origin quota system,
Congress set immigration limits on a country-by-country basis. Each
nationality's annual quota was based on its proportion of the total U.S.
population in 1920, and total annual immigration was restricted to
150,000 persons."0
A number of agencies within the executive branch have at various times
been responsible for enforcing immigration laws. During the late nine-
teenth century, enforcement authority resided in the Treasury Depart-
ment's Bureau of Immigration. In 1903, jurisdiction was transferred to
the newly-created Department of Commerce and Labor. 2' When Con-
gress divided the old department in 1913, responsibility remained with the
Department of Labor.22 For the next twenty years, immigration and natu-
ralization activities were carried out by two distinct bureaus within the
Department of Labor; these were consolidated in 1933 with the creation
of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). 2 The present orga-
nizational structure was established in 1940 when the INS became part of
the Department of Justice.24
15. See V. BRIG(;,s, supra note 5, at 261. This list includes the insane, professional beggars,
communists, Nazi war criminals, and graduates of foreign medical schools.
16. Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58.
17. Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874.
18. Immigration Act of 1921, ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5.
19. Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153.
20. Id. at §§ 11(b). The formula for calculating each country's quota was:
Quota of Country X = Persons of X Descent in U.S. in 1920.
150,000 All Inhabitants of U.S. in 1920
21. Act of February 14, 1903, ch. 552, 32 Stat. 825. It is significant that, as immigration policy
became more restrictive around the turn of the century, the government agency most sensitive to the
problems of labor was empowered to handle immigration issues.
22. Act of March 4, 1913, ch. 141, § 3, 37 Stat. 736 (1913).
23. Exec. Order No. 6166 § 14 (1933), reprinted at 5 U.S.C. § 901.
24. Reorg. Plan No. 5 of 1940, 3 C.F.R. 1304 (1938-1943 compilation), reprinted at appendix to
5 U.S.C., p. 1026, and in 54 Stat. 1238 (1939). For general background on the history of the enforce-
ment bureaucracy as well as details on its present functioning, see V. BRIGGS, supra note 5, at 5,
38-39.
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Modern immigration policy dates from the 1952 Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA),"8 which repealed or revised most existing immi-
gration laws and, for the first time, created an administrative process for
deporting aliens. In 1965, Congress amended the INA to abolish the na-
tional origin principle effective July 1, 1968 and to change the ceiling on
total annual immigration." The new ceiling exempted refugees, immedi-
ate relatives of U.S. citizens, and persons seeking political asylum. The
amendments also created the current preference system that gives entry
priority to family members of U.S. citizens. The Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986 attempts to increase the effectiveness of the existing
regulatory regime by improving its control over illegal immigration.
II. The Interest Group Model Applied to Immigration Enforcement
From the conventional perspective, normative questions dominate the
debate over immigration policy; immigration is characterized as either
"good" or "bad" in some sense. Current theoretical discussions, for exam-
ple, have centered on whether immigrants "displace" domestic workers.17
In contrast, this Article uses the interest group theory of government to
identify a political process through which self-interested groups influence
INS enforcement activities in order to affect the wage rate."
The interest group theory suggests that the implementation of public
policy is determined by the interplay between the concentrated interests of
groups seeking wealth transfers and the more diffuse interests of groups
that supply these transfers.29 This interaction produces a political equilib-
rium and a pattern of transfers in which some groups benefit at the
25. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503.
26. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911
(codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
27. A recent study concludes that, on balance, immigrants provide benefits to the economy. See J.
SIMON, How Do IMMIGRAN'rs AFFF.Gr Us ECONOMICALLY? (1985). Simon argues that immigration
does not have a statistically significant effect on aggregate employment and wages. See also Simon,
For an Open-Door Policy, Wall St. J., October 9, 1986, at 32, col. 5. Our conclusion, that enforce-
ment tends to restrict immigration during economic downturns and vice versa, thereby "smoothing
out" immigration flows over the business cycle, helps explain Simon's findings. When aggregate em-
ployment and wages are depressed, our model suggests that immigration will be curtailed, and vice
versa; for this reason, swings in these economic statistics will be insulated, to a degree, from any
significant immigration effect.
28. It is the role of regulators to enforce immigration laws which are enacted by legislators. This
Article models the interaction between different constituencies and regulators in order to explain the
level of enforcement of immigration policy. The process of developing policy, characterized by a simi-
lar dynamic between interest groups and legislators, is not examined in this Article.
29. We use "interest group theory of government" to describe an analytical approach commonly
used in legal, economic, and political scholarship. The major theoretical building blocks of this theory
were developed in Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. L. & ECON. 211
(1976) and Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcON. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971).
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expense of others. Regulators and legislators, who administer these trans-
fers and thus perform a brokerage function, seek to maximize their total
political support. This model generates a rich set of empirical predictions
about government behavior, and has been useful in explaining a large
number of economic and social regulatory initiatives.30
The interest group theory is based on George Stigler's generalization of
the simple "capture theory" of economic regulation. Stigler recognized
that "the political process automatically admits powerful outsiders to the
industry's councils," and that government policy therefore frequently
reflects the preferences of interested parties.3" Sam Peltzman extended and
formalized Stigler's argument by positing a vote-maximizing regulator
who seeks to maximize his political majority subject to a limited political
"budget."3" When choosing policy, the regulator always faces a trade-off:
The support of recipients of wealth transfers must be balanced against the
ill will of those supplying the transfer.
This Article's application of the interest group model to immigration
policy enforcement focuses on the competing interests of two stylized
groups, labor and producers.33 In this setting, a regulator's political wel-
fare rests on a successful balancing of domestic wage rates, w, and pro-
ducer wealth, ir. Assuming that, at some point, political support dimin-
ishes for regulators who attempt to raise or lower wages, and assuming no
intra-group effects, the marginal conditions for the regulator can be repre-
sented in w-ir space with a series of "iso-majority" curves. These curves
trace out the various combinations of wage rates and producer profits that
correspond to given levels of political support.
For producers, wealth (or success) is a function of price and production
costs. If we assume that the former is constant and the latter depends only
upon the level of wage rates, then given a limited supply of labor, the
producer's situation can be represented by a "profit hill," which rises
30. For general background as well as a discussion of the impact of interest groups on health care
policy, see Feldstein, The Political Environment of Regulation, in REGULATING HEALTH CARE:
THE S'TRUG;GLE FOR CONTROL. 6 (A. Levin ed. 1980). For historical examples of the influence inter-
est groups have on policy-such as provisions of the Magna Carta which favored particular traders of
cloth in thirteenth and fourteenth century England-see Yandle, Intertwined Interests, Rent Seeking
and Regulation, 65 So×'. Sci,. Q. 1002 (1984).
31. Stigler, supra note 29, at 7.
32. Peltzman, supra note 29, at 213.
33. It is beyond the scope of this Article to define these groups in a specific way, or to describe in
detail the mechanisms through which they operate. Rather than detailing the specific actions and
positions of certain lobbies, unions, and political action committees, the point here is to divide those
who would influence immigration into two broad but distinct categories defined by interest. For the
purpose of discussion and in accordance with tradition, we label these groups "labor" and "produc-
ers." For an interesting discussion of the current complex relationship between unions and illegal
immigrants, see Solis, Their Ranks Eroded, Unions Try to Recruit Illegal Immigrants, Wall St. J.,
October 15, 1986, at 1, col. I (describing recruitment of illegal aliens by American labor unions).
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initially as wages fall, reaches a maximum, and then declines as labor
becomes scarce and wages rise. In the model, the political equilibrium
among regulators, producers, and labor occurs where an iso-majority
curve lies just tangent to the profit hill.
Changes in aggregate demand-and therefore in the size of the econ-
omy-shift the profit hill and the political equilibrium, thereby altering
"the total surplus ...over which the regulator might have control and
the political payoff for its redistribution.""4 In the language of the theory
of consumer choice, a parametric shift has given rise to a substitution
effect and what Peltzman calls a "political wealth" effect, resulting in a
new optimal political equilibrium. Because regulators operate on two
margins, balancing two sets of interests, they "will, in general, not force
the entire adjustment onto one group."3
To illustrate, suppose aggregate demand falls, decreasing the total
wealth available for redistribution. Producer profits would decline, pro-
ducer output would decline and, as a result, producer demand for labor
inputs would drop, pressuring wage levels downward. If the political
wealth effect is important, the regulator in this instance will have an
incentive to prevent wages from falling by as much as they would in an
unregulated setting; in other words, Peltzman's regulator will call upon
producers to share some of labor's losses.
One way of redistributing these losses would be to enforce restrictive
immigration laws by deporting previously admitted immigrants. In this
case, the supply of workers available to domestic firms would decrease and
wages would increase, thereby shifting some of the burden of the recession
from domestic workers to domestic producers, who must pay more for
labor, and foreign workers, who are denied entrance and job
opportunities.
Similarly, if aggregate demand rises, immigration authorities would re-
distribute some of labor's gains to producers because increased wealth
raises the political payoff from redistribution. In this case, regulators
would enforce immigration policy more loosely to prevent domestic wages
from rising as much as they otherwise would. In sum, the interest group
theory of government predicts that immigration regulators will tend to
cushion domestic labor's losses during economic contractions and attenuate
labor's gains during expansions. Immigration enforcement will thus be
countercyclical, becoming more restrictive when demand declines and less
so when demand increases."
34. Peltzman, supra note 29, at 224-25.
35. Peltzman, supra note 29, at 225.
36. This aspect of the interest-group hypothesis has been characterized as "share the gain, share
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III. Empirical Model and Results
The interest group theory views changes in the level of immigration
enforcement as responses to pressure from groups concerned with immi-
gration's effect upon domestic wage rates. During downturns in the
domestic economy, the theory predicts, enforcement activities will increase
in order to prevent wages from falling as much as they otherwise would.
Conversely, when domestic labor markets are "tight," the theory holds
that immigration enforcement will be less restrictive.
In order to test this hypothesis, the authors constructed a regression
specification of the following general form:
6
Q b0+bl CYCLEr + b2 RBUDt + 2; bi Dit + b7 PDUMt + et,
i=3
where
Q - one of two alternative measures of immigration
enforcement activity;
CYCLE, one of three measures of general economic activity in
the U.S., real Gross National Product, RGNP, the
civilian labor force unemployment rate, U, and real
average gross hourly earnings in manufacturing,
RWAGE;
RBUD, = real budgetary appropriations of the agency having
jurisdiction over immigration;
Di, =- a set of four dummy variables to account for important
institutional and legal changes affecting immigration
policy;
PDUM t  = a dummy variable denoting the political party of the
president; and
e, =- regression error term.
Two different measures of immigration enforcement activity were uti-
lized: (i) the ratio of aliens deported to total immigrants, and (ii) the ratio
of aliens required to depart to total immigrants. These measures reflect
the two ways in which aliens are expelled. The first, formal deportation,
requires an order by an immigration judge based upon a finding that the
alien in question, for one or more of a variety of reasons, is "deport-
able."'8 7 The second, a request to depart, may be made by immigration
the pain." Hirshleifer, Comment, 19 J. L. & FAON. 241, 243 (1976).
37. The criteria for deportability are set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1251. The procedures for deportation
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officers without a hearing before an immigration judge. Individuals who
do not depart "voluntarily" will eventually undergo deportation
proceedings.
These variables are designed to capture the two main enforcement
mechanisms which immigration authorities have at their disposal. A shift
toward a more (less) restrictive policy can be accomplished either by
granting entry to a smaller (larger) number of foreigners, or by increasing
(reducing) the number of deportations, or by doing both. 8 Through the
use of a ratio rather than an absolute number, the model controls for
differences in total immigration from year to year.
It is important to note that our data on total immigration account only
for those individuals who enter the country legally, since no reliable statis-
tics on illegal immigrants are available. The Census Bureau estimates that
three million to five million illegal aliens now reside in the United
States.89 Illegal immigration is clearly a substitute for legal entry. When
immigration policy is restrictive, we expect an increase in the number of
aliens entering the U.S. illegally. Such considerations, however, should not
greatly affect our hypothesis that the U.S. immigration authorities are in
the business of influencing domestic wages.
Table 1
Summary Statistics for Immigration Activity,
1900 - 1982
Standard Coefficient
Variable Mean Deviation of Variation
M Immigrants admitted 386,357 305,509 0.79
D Aliens deported 10,126 7,638 0.75
E Aliens required to depart (1931-82) a  297,464 336,578 1.13
D/M 0.07 0.12 1.71
E/M 1.04 1.13 1.09
RBUD Real immigration budget
(Smil.) 46.16 40.61 0.88
RGNP Real GNP (Sbil.)b 413.51 325.84 0.79
U Unemployment rate 6.70 5.15 0.77
RWAGE Real hourly wage rate in manufacturing
(1919- 1982)b 2.06 0.76 0.37
a Aliens expelled minus aliens deported.
b1972 dollars.
appear in 8 C.F.R. §§ 242-43 (1986).
38. We do not address naturalization activities as a control on the supply of labor because of the
time lags involved in the process by which a foreigner becomes a U.S. citizen.
39. N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1986, at A12, col. 2.
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Observations on all but one of the variables were obtained from stan-
dard government sources. 4' Table 1 presents the data in summary form.
The data suggest that, on average, the number of aliens expelled in a
typical year exceeds the number granted entry under the immigration
laws: 7% are deported and over 100% are required to depart. The latter
figure, of course, reflects in part the magnitude of illegal immigration, but
it still suggests that the overall scale of enforcement activities is quite sub-
stantial. The principal test of the interest group hypothesis centers upon
the estimated coefficients of CYCLE. We expect negative signs on the
dependent variables RGNP and RWAGE, and a positive sign on U. Other
things being equal, the interest group theory would interpret such results
as indicating that the immigration authorities expel a higher proportion of
aliens from the United States during downturns in the business cycle
because the political payoff from protecting domestic labor increases when
wages are falling. Conversely, fewer expulsions would occur in times
when the labor supply is tight because the political payoff from assisting
producers by expanding the workforce increases when wages are rising.
RBUD represents yearly input expenditures by the various agencies
that have had jurisdiction over immigration. This variable is expected to
be positively related to immigration enforcement activity. By holding
budgetary expenditures constant, we effectively have a model in which
changes in the "demand" for enforcement by interest groups are traced
along the INS "supply" schedule, where "price" is political support.
The regression specification contains a set of four dummy variables that
account for important changes in United States immigration laws.41 These
variables, defined in Table 2, control for changes in historical conditions
and overall changes in Congressional policy."2 We make no predictions
about the signs on these dummy variables.
40. The macroeconomic data and the various enforcement activity measures were obtained from
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAi. AsrRACr OF THE UNITED STATES (1975, updated through
1982). Observations on the budget of the INS and its predecessors were provided by the Office of
Public Affairs, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Washington, D.C. Manufacturing wage
data were obtained from ECONOMIC STATISTICS BUREAU, HANDBOOK OF BASIC ECONOMIC STATIS-
riCs 24-25 (1986). These data are on file with the Yale Journal on Regulation.
41. For an explanation of how dummy variables are used in regression analysis, see R. PINDYCK
& D. RUBINFEID, ECONOMETRIC MODELS AND ECONOMETRIC FORECASTS 111-16 (2d ed. 1981).
These variables are also referred to as "zero-one" variables; they are used to control for events which
are exogenous to the regression model.
42. Although the national origin quota system was not implemented until the mid-twenties, we
date the onset of substantial immigration barriers to the passage of the Act of 1917.
Vol. 4: 79, 1986
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Table 2
Definitions of Dummy Variables
DI Pre-national origins quota system (equals unity for the years 1900 through 1917,
and zero otherwise).
D2 Literacy tests and national origins quotas (equals unity for the years 1918 through
1965, and zero otherwise).
D3 World Wars I and II (equals unity for the years 1914-1917 and 1940-1945, and
zero otherwise).
D4 Current preference system (equals unity for the years 1966 through 1982, and
zero otherwise).
Finally, PDUM accounts for the political party affiliation of the presi-
dent, taking on the value of one for Democrats and zero for Republicans.
This variable is intended to measure the responsiveness of immigration
enforcement to partisan political pressures, because enforcement authority
has always resided in the executive branch of government. Conventional
wisdom suggests that party ties to labor interests would lead Democratic
presidents to adopt a more activist role in immigration enforcement. But
partisanship does not matter in the interest group model. Peltzman's regu-
lators respond systematically to changes in the demand for regulation so as
to maximize their chances for political survival."8 This behavior is largely
independent of party labels. It depends on factors not systematically
related to party affiliation, such as the amount of wealth available for
redistribution and the nature of the trade-off between producer and labor
protection. Accordingly, the interest group theory suggests that the iden-
tity of the party occupying the White House should have little influence
on immigration enforcement activity. Only if the conventional wisdom is
correct would we expect a positive sign on PDUM.
Regression data were corrected for serial correlation using the tech-
nique of Cochrane-Orcutt."" In addition, some specifications were esti-
mated using the technique of instrumental variables."' The adjustment
was necessary because the flow of immigration and the level of enforce-
ment resources available to immigration regulators are unlikely to be
independent of each other, or of the state of the economy. We therefore
estimated separate regression equations to explain variations in annual
immigration, M, and the immigration budget, RBUD, and used the
43. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
44. The Cochrane-Orcutt methodology is discussed in R. PINDYCK & D. RUBINFELO, supra note
41, at 157.
45. The instrumental variables technique involves development of a new variable, z, which is
highly correlated with the independent variables, yet still uncorrelated with the error term. R.
PINDYCK & D. RUBINFEID, supra note 41, at 178-80.
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predicted values as our instruments.' The predicted values for immigra-
tion were then used as the denominator in calculating the dependent vari-
able for our enforcement equation. Although we planned to treat the im-
migration budget as a policy tool used by Congress to influence
enforcement efforts, no empirical relationship was found between appro-
priations and any measure of immigration enforcement activity. The pre-
dicted values, FBGT, from a regression of the immigration budget on a
linear time trend, time squared, and PDUM were nevertheless used as
explanatory variables.' 7
All continuous variables were then transformed by taking their natural
logarithms.48 The redefined variables are LB, log of real enforcement
budget; LRGNP, log of real GNP; LU, log of unemployment rate; LRW,
log of real manufacturing wage; and LT, a log-linear time trend. The
regression estimates using deportations as the enforcement activity mea-
sure are shown in Tables 3 through 5.
The results offer strong support for the interest group hypothesis.49
46. In particular, we regressed the number of immigrants admitted to the United States in a given
year on the level of real GNP in the previous year, on a linear time trend, and on three of our dummy
variables.
The results were as follows:
M = 449,623.95 + 1,367.40 RGNP(-)-17,217.51 T + 444,545.28 D1
(2.98)*** (-2.85)*** (2.46)**
+ 78,067.50 D2 - 146,435.83 D3;
(0.55) (- 1.89)*
= 0.4743, R2 = 0.785, d = 1.93, F = 45.59,
where RGNP(-I) is real GNP lagged one year, T is a linear time trend, and is the estimated first-
order autocorrelation coefficient.
47. The fitted values were obtained from the following regression:
RBUD = 22,757.33 - 1, 302.73 T + 33.42 T + 3,108.07 PDUM;
(-2.56)** (6.33)*** (1.94)*
= 0.8037, R2 = 0.990, d= 1.85, F = 1,877.25
48. Logarithmic transformations can be used as a means of removing growth over time of the
variance of the data. R. PINDYCK & D. RUBINFEI.D, supra note 41, at 590.
49. The R' values for the deportation regression models were all in the range of 90-95% when
GNP or unemployment were used as the measure of economic activity. In other words, over 90% of
the variation in enforcement activity could be explained by the predictive variables in these models.
The R' value for the deportation model which included wage rates as the dependent variable was
approximately 75%.
In nearly every case, the regression coefficients on the economic variables in the deportation model
were statistically significant. Specifically, the coefficients for GNP and the real wage rate were signifi-
cant at the one percent level (99% confidence level) and unemployment was significant at the five
percent level (95% confidence level). The coefficients on the trend and dummy variables for wartime
were similarly reliable, but trend contributed little to the model which measured economic activity
using the unemployment rate. The results for the remaining dummy variables, including the party
indicator for the President, were not statistically significant, and in some cases the parameter value did
not bear out the expected relationship.
The R' statistic may sometimes be misleading because it is sensitive to the number of predictive
variables used in the model. In fact, including more independent variables in the regression "can never
lower the R' and is likely to raise it .. " R. PINDYCK & D. RUBINFELD, supra note 41, at 79.
Since most of the models included at least seven independent variables, the R' values should be inter-
preted with caution.
Immigration
The ratio of aliens deported to total immigrants increases as real GNP
falls (Table 3), as the unemployment rate rises (Table 4), and as real
wages decline (Table 5). Thus, the level of immigration enforcement
appears to vary in a counter-cyclical fashion. This result supports the the-
ory that the immigration authorities use deportations to transfer wealth,
mitigating downward or upward pressure on wages.
The model also supports the notion that while political pressures matter
to basic policy formulation, party labels do not-a conclusion which is
consistent with Peltzman's hypothesis that regulators are responsive to the
demand for regulation independent of party politics. Although immigra-
tion authorities receive significantly larger budgets during Democratic
administrations,5" the additional resources do not translate into increased
enforcement activities when all other factors are held equal. This finding
implies that those favoring stricter enforcement efforts should consider
alternatives to increased budgetary resources as a means of achieving their
goal.
In addition, the model suggests that immigration enforcement was
looser during the period preceding national origins quotas (D1), and more
restrictive following the establishment of literacy tests and numerical quo-
tas (D2). The data suggest that immigration enforcement was even more
restrictive during wartime (D3), and that enforcement has not relaxed
substantially under the current preference system (D4).
Because the data are entered in their logarithms, the estimated coeffi-
cients on the continuous variables can be directly interpreted as elastici-
ties. The results suggest that immigration enforcement activities are most
responsive to changes in real wages and least responsive to changes in the
unemployment rate. For example, a 1% increase in real hourly manufac-
turing earnings leads to a 5.5% to 5.7% reduction in the ratio of aliens
deported to total immigrants. In contrast, a 1% decrease in the civilian
unemployment rate causes only a 0.20% to 0.28% fall in enforcement
activity. This implies that domestic wages are indeed the main variable of
interest to the immigration authorities.
Regressions that used required departures rather than the number of
deportations as the measure of enforcement activity yielded similar results,
50. See supra note 47.
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Table 3
Dependent Variable: Log Ratio of Aliens Deported
























































































D-W is the Durbin-Watson d.
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Table 5
Dependent Variable: Log Ratio of Aliens Deported














































F 15.15 17.69 17.51
Notes:
t-statistics in parentheses.
D-W is the Durbin-Watson d.
Asterisks denote significance at the I percent (*), 5 percent (**), and 10 percent (*) levels.
P, and l,, are the estimated first and second-order autocorrelation coefficients, respectively.
providing further support for the interest group hypothesis (Table 6)."'
Although the estimated coefficients on real wages were not statistically
significant, the weight of the evidence suggests that, as a proportion of
total immigrants, the number of aliens required to depart in a given year
depends on domestic economic conditions.
51. Because data on the use of required departures are only available beginning in 1931, a
dummy variable for the pre-1917 national origins quota could not be used. As with the models using
deportation as a measure of immigration enforcement, the R' values were fairly high. The R2 value
was approximately .87, regardless of the choice of economic variables. The coefficients on the wage
rate were not statistically d significant, while the coefficients on unemployment and GNP were signifi-
cant at the five percent level. Coefficients on the trend and dummy variables were found to be signifi-
cant at the one percent to ten percent levels.
Immigration
Table 6
Dependent Variable: Log Ratio of Required Departures










































































































D-W is the Durbin-Watson d.
Asterisks denote significance at the 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**), and 10 percent (*) levels.
I, and 0s are the estimated first and second-order autocorrelation coefficients, respectively.
Conclusion
This Article's analysis of United States immigration policy during the
twentieth century is based on the methodology of positive economics. It
represents an attempt to step back from the rhetoric surrounding recent
proposals to reform immigration law, and ask whose public and whose
interests are actually served by INS enforcement activities. Insofar as the
empirical results presented here show that such enforcement efforts tend
to "smooth" immigration flows over the business cycle, domestic labor and
producer interests emerge as the elemental forces that shape practices
affecting the admission of aliens to the United States.
Yale Journal on Regulation
The interest group model, as applied to immigration enforcement, sheds
explanatory light on specific provisions of the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986. The Act can be seen as a means of regulating the
flow of illegal laborers into the United States. In a provision that Presi-
dent Reagan described as "the keystone" of thF legislation, Congress made
employers who hire illegal aliens subject to penalties of $250 to $10,000
for each such alien."2 The President noted that this provision "will remove
the incentive for illegal immigration by eliminating the job opportunities
which draw illegal aliens here." ' Of course, the effectiveness of the new
penalty will depend on its enforcement, which this Article has shown
depends in turn on the interaction between regulators and their two major
constituencies. Fines against employers who hire illegal aliens will
undoubtedly serve as another tool with which regulators can adjust the
labor supply in order to maximize political support.
Conversely, the Act's retroactive amnesty provisions may be viewed as
an immediate concession to producers made in a time of tight labor sup-
ply. These provisions benefit producers-and tie the hands of regulators
to some extent-by reducing the number of employed aliens who would
otherwise be subject to administrative action. For example, the Act pro-
vides amnesty and legal status for illegal aliens who can prove they have
been living continuously in the U.S. since before January 1, 1982.5" Since
these illegal aliens presumably had some source of employment in this
country in order to survive for four years, the Act bestows a benefit on
producer interests by making an existing labor supply more secure. Simi-
larly, the Act grants amnesty to agricultural workers who were employed
for ninety days in the twelve-month period preceding May 1, 1986."* This
provision has openly been characterized as a concession to Western and
Southern farmers, who want a dependable supply of migrant workers. 6
In the area of international trade, explicit protectionist tariffs are often
used as a means of keeping jobs at home that would otherwise be lost to
foreign countries.5" Immigration enforcement appears to be a similar
device for government intervention in the economy: Restraints on immi-
gration guard against competition from foreign workers residing in the
United States, while restraints on imports of foreign goods guard U.S. jobs
against competition from workers residing in other countries. The
52. N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1986, at A12, col. 1.
53. Id.
54. Harvest of Confusion, TIME., Nov. 3, 1986, at 28.
55. Id.
56. Id.; N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1986, at A12, col. 4.
57. For a discussion of protectionism and the politics of current U.S. trade policy, see Czinkola,
U.S. Trade Policy and Congress, 20 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 71 (1986).
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Immigration
assiduous enforcement of restrictive immigration policy is thus analogous
to tariffs which protect domestic industry from competition. Consequently,
immigration policy and its enforcement can be viewed as another way to
balance the interests of competing groups.
Immigration enforcement thus operates in much the same fashion as
other regulation: It mediates between interest groups, in this case domes-
tic producers and labor. Because the distribution of respective gains and
losses shift over the business cycle, immigration enforcement activities vary
predictably, abating during economic expansions when output and wages
are rising, and becoming more vigorous during economic downturns when
output and wages are falling. In the authors' view, this type of hard eco-
nomic analysis should supplant-or at least illuminate-the traditional,
emotional debate over immigration, in which the advocates of restrictive
legislation exploit latent xenophobia and the critics appeal to the nation's
immigrant pride.

